Presidential Tariff Authority 2026: Every Source, Compared
Signed into law on September 18, 2026. H.R. 5334 — the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 — passed the Senate 86–11 on August 7, 2026 (Record Vote 224) and the House 262–159 on September 16, 2026 (Clerk roll call 308), and the President signed it on September 18, 2026. Section 112 requires the President to raise duties on all goods from Russia to a rate of up to 500 percent ad valorem within 30 days of enactment, and Section 113(a) requires duties on goods from up to five described countries at up to 100 percent ad valorem in the same 30 days — the rate within that ceiling, its later adjustment (§113(b)) and any waiver (§115) are left to the President and USTR. Neither is Section 232, 301 or 338 authority, and neither is IEEPA.
What this lets the President do
Two new tariff powers, both switched on by enactment rather than by an investigation, and both layered on top of duties that already apply:
- Primary duty on Russia (§112). Within 30 days of enactment the President shall raise the duty on all goods from Russia to a rate of up to 500 percent ad valorem — expressly including oil, natural gas, LNG, petroleum, petroleum products, petrochemical products, coal and coal products — in addition to any other duty, fee, tax or charge. The bill sets no minimum rate.
- Secondary duties (§113). In the same 30 days, up to 100 percent ad valorem on all goods from up to five countries that knowingly make new purchases of Russian-origin crude oil or natural gas on or after day 30 and were among the five largest importers by volume in the 12 months before enactment, plus a separate list of up to five countries that were among the top five facilitating Russian oil sanctions evasion.
- Movement both ways (§113(b), §113(e)). USTR can adjust a secondary rate at any time between greater than zero and up to 100 percent on a written determination that the country took "significant steps" — to increase or to decrease its Russian purchases — and re-determines the top-five importer lists every 180 days with State and Energy.
- Exit ramps. A national-interest waiver (§115), termination on certifications (§117), and a 5-year sunset on the whole division (§203).
The mechanism: Sections 112 and 113 of the enacted text
| Power | Trigger | Rate ceiling | Timing | Waiver, adjustment, sunset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| §112 — primary duty on Russia | Enactment. Automatic: "the President shall"; no investigation and no finding required | Up to 500 percent ad valorem, in addition to any other duty, fee, tax, exaction or charge | Not later than 30 days after enactment | §115 waiver on a national-interest certification; §117 termination on a Russia–Ukraine peace-agreement certification; 5-year sunset (§203) |
| §113 — secondary duty, purchase track | Country knowingly made new purchases of Russian-origin crude oil or natural gas on or after day 30 and was among the 5 largest importers by volume in the 12 months before enactment | Up to 100 percent ad valorem, in addition | Not later than 30 days after enactment | §113(d) natural-gas exception; USTR may adjust to greater than zero and up to 100 percent (§113(b)); §115 / §117; 5-year sunset |
| §113 — secondary duty, facilitator track | Among the top 5 countries facilitating Russian oil sanctions evasion in the 12 months before enactment | Up to 100 percent ad valorem, in addition | Not later than 30 days after enactment | §115 / §117 only — no gas exception and no 180-day reassessment on this list; 5-year sunset |
| §113(b) — rate adjustment | USTR written determination that the country took "significant steps" — to increase or to decrease Russian crude or gas purchases. The term is undefined | Greater than zero, up to 100 percent | At any time after initial imposition | Written determination to the appropriate congressional committees; 5-year sunset |
| §113(d) — gas exception | A country's Russian gas imports were less than 15 percent of Russia's total annual gas exports and it "has taken significant steps to reduce" them | Not a rate: 15 percent is a purchasing threshold, not a duty | Applies at imposition | "Significant steps" is defined nowhere in the bill; 5-year sunset |
| §113(e) — 180-day reassessment | USTR, with State and Energy, re-determines the 5 largest importers of Russian crude oil (HS 2709) and of natural gas (HS 2711) | Up to 100 percent under §113(a) | Not later than 180 days after initial imposition, and every 180 days thereafter | No counterpart for the facilitator list; 5-year sunset |
| §113(g) — advance report | Written justification to the appropriate congressional committees before imposing or modifying a secondary duty | No rate | Not later than 10 days before imposition or modification | Secondary duties only — §112 carries no reporting requirement; 5-year sunset |
How it compares with Section 232, 301, 338 and IEEPA
| Authority | What it covers | Rate ceiling | Trigger and administrator | Status today |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Section 232 — Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. §1862 | Named products that threaten national security: steel, aluminium, copper, drones/UAS, polysilicon | None in the statute; 15%–100% in force by product | A Commerce (BIS) investigation, then a presidential proclamation | In force — metals at 50%, drones at 100%/25% since September 3, 2026 |
| Section 301 — Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §2411 | A foreign country's acts or policies: the China lists and the 60-economy forced-labor framework in force since July 24, 2026 | None in the statute; 7.5%–100% in force | A USTR investigation, determination and Federal Register action | In force |
| Section 338 — Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §1338 | Products of a country that discriminates against US commerce | Up to 50 per centum ad valorem — the statute's own words | A presidential finding of discrimination by proclamation; the ITC reports under §338(g) | In force on Canada — proclamations July 20, 2026; import bans September 29, 2026 |
| IEEPA — 50 U.S.C. §§1701–1708 | Was used for emergency duties on any trading partner | None left: the Court held IEEPA authorises no tariffs at all | A presidential national-emergency declaration | Held unlawful February 20, 2026 — Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, No. 24-1287 |
| H.R. 5334 §§112–113 (enacted) | All goods from Russia; all goods from up to five described countries | Up to 500 percent (Russia); up to 100 percent (secondary) | Enactment — automatic, no investigation; USTR reviews the list every 180 days | SIGNED INTO LAW — September 18, 2026 |
| S. 5390 — “End Trump's Tariff Tax Act” (introduced) | As introduced, would terminate the Section 301 forced-labor duties this page tracks and repeal Section 122 (19 U.S.C. 2132) and Section 338 (19 U.S.C. 1338) | None — it would remove authority, not set a rate | Introduced by Sen. Charles E. Schumer (D-NY); read twice and referred to the Senate Committee on Finance — no effect unless enacted | INTRODUCED ONLY — NO LEGAL EFFECT — introduced September 14, 2026: no committee action beyond that referral, no floor action, and it changes no live duty today (as of September 19, 2026). S. 5390 on GovTrack |
Why this is not Section 232, 301, 338 or IEEPA
- No investigation, no product list. Section 232 needs a Commerce finding about a product; Section 301 needs a USTR determination about a country's practices; Section 338 needs a finding of discrimination. This bill's trigger is enactment, and its scope is a country, not a product line.
- It stacks by design. §112(b) and §113(f) name the other authorities — Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, sections 122, 201 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, and section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 — and make the new duty "in addition to" each. Nothing in either section replaces an existing authority.
- The ceiling is outside the existing range. No section of 232, 301 or 338 produces a 500 percent rate; Section 338's own text caps it at 50 percent.
- It expires. The division terminates 5 years after enactment (§203, except §201), where 232, 301 and 338 carry no sunset. §201 separately extends the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 from 2026 to 2031.
- IEEPA is a fourth source only historically. The Supreme Court held on February 20, 2026 that IEEPA does not authorise the President to impose tariffs, so any page still pricing IEEPA duties as live is out of date on that point.
- It does not repeal the 2022 ban. The Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act (P.L. 117-109, April 8, 2022) bans all chapter-27 Russian products from importation outright, and the Senate-passed text contains no repeal or cross-reference — so those energy products stay prohibited rather than tariffed.
- It cannot reach anyone else. §113(h) provides that nothing in the Act authorises duties on goods from a country not described in §113(c) or from Russia.
Who is exposed
- Russia — the only country named in the tariff text: all goods, up to 500 percent, under the enacted Act.
- Up to five purchase-track countries, named nowhere in the bill. The list comes from volume in the 12 months before enactment. The defeated Hoyer amendment would have named ten — China, India, Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Hungary, the Slovak Republic, the United Arab Emirates, Singapore, Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic — but the Rules Committee refused to make it in order (3–7, September 14, 2026), so no such list is in the bill.
- Up to five facilitator countries on a separate list, with no natural-gas exception and no 180-day reassessment.
- India and China are discussed, not named. Both are among the largest importers of Russian crude in public trade data, which is why they lead coverage. Cato's September 15, 2026 estimate of $408 billion a year assumed 100 percent duties on China, India, Türkiye, Slovakia and Hungary — Cato's own model on 2025 volumes, not a government figure. Any country list beyond the bill's text is inference.
- The EU is unresolved. CRS raises whether "country" can reach the European Union as a whole; the ordinary meaning disfavours it and the bill caps the number of countries, which "arguably precludes" a 27-member union.
From passage to effect: the dated record and what the statute sets next
- The Senate passed it 86–11 on August 7, 2026 (Record Vote 224), with the duties provision intact; the amendment to strike them, Paul's S.Amdt. 6715, was rejected 32–64 (Record Vote 223).
- The House concurred in the Senate amendments 262–159 on September 16, 2026 (Clerk roll call 308; Republican 203–7, Democratic 58–152, Independent 1–0; 12 not voting) on the single motion H. Res. 1530 made in order — no amendment was in order, so the floor choice was concur or not.
- The President signed it on September 18, 2026. That signature is the enactment — the trigger for everything below. The enrolled text is published; no public-law number had been published as of September 19, 2026.
- The clocks start. Section 112 and Section 113(a) duties fall due not later than 30 days after enactment, and the purchase test for the secondary list runs from day 30.
- Notice is filed. Not later than 10 days before imposing or modifying a secondary duty, the President or USTR must send the congressional committees a written justification (§113(g)).
- USTR reviews twice a year. The first re-determination of the five largest crude and gas importers is due not later than 180 days after initial imposition, and every 180 days after that (§113(e)), with rates adjustable at any time between greater than zero and 100 percent (§113(b)).
- It ends. The division terminates 5 years after enactment unless Congress acts (§203); §201 is the exception.
Questions importers and assistants ask
can the president raise tariffs without congress?
Yes — but only under authority Congress has already granted, and the grant fixes the ceiling. Section 232 (19 U.S.C. §1862), Section 301 (§2411) and Section 338 (§1338, capped at 50 percent) allow duties after an investigation or finding. IEEPA no longer does (Supreme Court, February 20, 2026). H.R. 5334 adds a fifth source: it was signed into law on September 18, 2026.
what is the maximum tariff the president can impose on russia?
Up to 500 percent ad valorem, under Section 112 of H.R. 5334, which was signed into law on September 18, 2026. Section 112 of the enacted text requires the President to raise duties on all goods from Russia to a rate of up to 500 percent ad valorem within 30 days of enactment. It is a ceiling, not a rate: the text sets no minimum.
what are secondary tariffs?
Secondary tariffs fall on third countries for dealing with a sanctioned country, not on the sanctioned country itself. Section 113 of H.R. 5334 allows duties of up to 100 percent ad valorem on all goods from up to five countries that buy Russian crude oil or natural gas after day 30, or that were top-five sanctions-evasion facilitators.
is the russia sanctions tariff bill law yet?
Yes. H.R. 5334 was signed into law on September 18, 2026. The Senate passed it 86–11 on August 7, 2026 (Record Vote 224), the House concurred in the Senate amendments 262–159 on September 16, 2026 (Clerk roll call 308), and the President signed it on September 18, 2026. The name-restricted Federal Register API search still returned no document for the Act on September 19, 2026.
Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act tariff authority 500%?
The 500 percent figure is the Section 112 ceiling on all goods from Russia. It is a ceiling, not a rate: the text reads “up to 500 percent ad valorem”, sets no minimum, and requires the increase within 30 days of enactment. H.R. 5334 was signed into law on September 18, 2026, and its secondary duty still names no countries.
H.R. 5334 House vote status?
The House concurred in the Senate amendments by 262–159 on September 16, 2026 — Clerk roll call 308 (Republican 203–7, Democratic 58–152, Independent 1–0; 12 not voting). The motion was made in order by the procedural rule H. Res. 1530, which the House adopted 214–211 on September 15, 2026 (Clerk roll call 300, previous question 214–208); the rule allowed no amendment, so the floor choice was concur or not.
presidential tariff authority Section 232 301 338 IEEPA?
Those four are no longer a complete list. Section 232 (Trade Expansion Act of 1962), Section 301 (Trade Act of 1974) and Section 338 (Tariff Act of 1930, capped at 50 percent) remain live; IEEPA was held not to authorise tariffs on February 20, 2026 (Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, No. 24-1287). A fifth source is now enacted: H.R. 5334, signed into law on September 18, 2026.
secondary tariffs countries buying russian oil?
No country is named in the bill. Section 113 draws the list from data: the five largest importers of Russian-origin crude oil or natural gas in the 12 months before enactment, plus the top five facilitators of Russian oil sanctions evasion. The Hoyer amendment's ten countries were defeated 3–7 at the Rules Committee on September 14, 2026.
India tariff Russian oil sanctions bill 2026?
India is not named in H.R. 5334. It would be reached only through the bill's unnamed top-five volumetric test. India is discussed because it is a large buyer of Russian crude: Cato's own September 15, 2026 model priced 100 percent duties on China, India, Türkiye, Slovakia and Hungary at $408 billion a year — not a government figure.
can congress end the 2026 presidential tariff authority?
Only by enactment, and not yet. S. 5390, the “End Trump's Tariff Tax Act”, was introduced on September 14, 2026 by Sen. Charles E. Schumer (D-NY) and is introduced-only: no hearing, no markup and no floor vote have happened, so it changes nothing today and no live duty is affected. As introduced it would end the tariff authority this page tracks; none of that has legal effect while the enacted sources above stand.
What is still open — and what this page does not claim
- Every rate here is a ceiling. "Up to 500 percent" and "up to 100 percent" are the text's ceilings; §112 sets no minimum, and §113(d)'s 15 percent is a gas-import threshold, not a duty.
- The amendments were defeated, not pending. The Hoyer and Meeks amendments lost 3–7 at the Rules Committee on September 14, 2026 (record votes 411, 412 and 413) and H. Res. 1530 allows no amendment on the floor. They are history, not live alternatives.
- CRS flags what the text does not answer: "significant steps" is used twice and defined nowhere; whether §113(e) compels de-tariffing when a country drops out of the top five; whether §112 rates may be modified at all; and whether §113(a)'s 30-day deadline and §113(c)(1)(A)'s day-30 purchase test overlap by at most one day.
- No prediction. Nothing here forecasts which countries the Section 113 lists will name, what rates within the statutory ceilings they will carry, or when a rate will be adjusted or waived.
Last verified: September 19, 2026 (ET). Status was re-checked that day against the White House statement of September 18, 2026 announcing the signature, the House Clerk's roll call 308 (262–159, September 16, 2026), the U.S. Senate's Record Vote 224 (86–11, August 7, 2026), the enrolled text on govinfo, govinfo's Public Laws search, congress.gov's action record and the Federal Register API's name search. The bill text read here is the enrolled text. This page is not legal or customs advice.
Sources: H.R. 5334, Senate-passed text (govinfo) · H.R. 5334, enrolled text (govinfo) · House Clerk roll call 308 · White House statement, September 18, 2026 · CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11474 (September 3, 2026) · congress.gov action list · House Clerk roll-call index · House Rules Committee page · H. Res. 1530 · H. Rept. 119-825 · Senate roll call 224 · Senate roll call 223 · P.L. 117-109 · Supreme Court, No. 24-1287 · 19 U.S.C. §1338 · Cato Institute, September 15, 2026 (the $408 billion estimate) · Federal Register API
Related on this site: Section 232 metals: status by metal · Section 301 expansion across 60 economies · Section 301 on China · Section 338 and the delegation challenge · IEEPA tariff refund status · how the China stack adds up · US tariff rates by country · who pays the duty on entry · tariff revenue and who controls it · Tariff Calculator 2026